







## ALGORITHMIC SUBORDINATION AND SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM IN THE GIG ECONOMY: CHALLENGES TO BRAZILIAN LABOR LAW

### SUBORDINAÇÃO ALGORÍTMICA E CAPITALISMO DE VIGILÂNCIA NA GIG ECONOMY: DESAFIOS AO DIREITO DO TRABALHO BRASILEIRO

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This study examines labor subordination in the Gig Economy within the framework of Brazilian labor law, highlighting tensions between traditional legal categories and digitally mediated work. Using a qualitative and exploratory approach based on documentary analysis, it reviews judicial decisions from the Brazilian Superior Labor Court (TST) and the Supreme Federal Court (STF) between 2021 and 2024. The findings reveal a lack of doctrinal and jurisprudential consensus, resulting in legal uncertainty. Although most decisions deny the existence of an employment relationship, elements such as control, dependency, and asymmetric risk distribution remain evident. The study argues that the classical notion of legal subordination is insufficient to explain platform labor, where control operates through algorithmic management, rating systems, and data-driven mechanisms. Incorporating the perspective of surveillance capitalism, the paper shows that platforms extend control through data extraction and processing, reinforcing structural dependency. Subordination thus emerges as a multidimensional phenomenon, encompassing legal, economic, and informational dimensions. The article contributes by proposing an expanded concept of subordination and highlights the need for regulatory innovation addressing platform work while ensuring minimum labor protections.

**Keywords:** Gig Economy; labor subordination; algorithmic management; surveillance capitalism; labor law.

Este estudo analisa a subordinação do trabalho na Gig Economy à luz do Direito do Trabalho brasileiro, evidenciando as tensões entre categorias jurídicas tradicionais e o trabalho mediado por plataformas digitais. Por meio de abordagem qualitativa e exploratória, com análise documental, examinam-se decisões do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho (TST) e do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) entre 2021 e 2024. Os resultados apontam ausência de consenso jurisprudencial, gerando insegurança jurídica. Embora prevaleça o não reconhecimento do vínculo empregatício, persistem elementos como controle, dependência e assimetria na distribuição de riscos. Argumenta-se que a subordinação jurídica clássica é insuficiente para compreender o trabalho em plataformas, no qual o controle ocorre por meio de gestão algorítmica, avaliações e mecanismos baseados em dados. Ao incorporar a perspectiva do capitalismo de vigilância, demonstra-se que as plataformas ampliam seu poder via extração e processamento de dados, reforçando a dependência estrutural. A subordinação passa, assim, a ser compreendida como fenômeno multidimensional, envolvendo dimensões

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jurídicas, econômicas e informacionais. O estudo propõe a ampliação do conceito de subordinação e destaca a necessidade de inovação regulatória que assegure proteção mínima ao trabalhador.

**Palavras-chave:** *Gig Economy*. Precarização do trabalho. Interpretação jurídica. Regulação trabalhista.

## INTRODUCTION

The concept of the Gig Economy originated in the United States during the 1920s and was initially used to refer to musicians, particularly jazz performers, as defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. The term “gig” is an abbreviation of “gigantic,” and it was used to describe professionals who performed their activities with flexible schedules but without legal guarantees. As this condition applied to most musicians at the time, the term became frequently associated with this professional category (Montgomery & Baglioni, 2021).

Over the years, alongside transformations in labor relations, the term Gig Economy came to denote an alternative mode of work, generally informal in nature, mediated by technology, short-term in duration, and compensated on a per-task basis (Abraham, 2017; Frogeri et al., 2026a).

The Gig Economy involves the exchange of labor for monetary compensation between individuals or companies through digital platforms that actively facilitate the matching of providers and clients, typically in short-term arrangements with payment per task (Abraham, 2017). Technological advancements have enabled the expansion of this type of activity across all sectors of the economy and have also impacted labor relations (Bellace, 2018). In parallel with these technological developments, the emergence of locative media, particularly those related to communication facilitation, has contributed to the expansion of the Gig Economy by allowing consumers to more easily contract services, including through the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology (Santaella, 2008).

The Gig Economy has thus emerged as an alternative form of work, typically informal, in which a specific payment is made for the execution of a particular task (Abraham, 2017). Initially, this practice was characterized as a means for professionals to increase their earnings, as digital platforms enabled them to reach a larger volume of clients (Abraham, 2017). However, with the COVID-19 pandemic, many formally employed workers lost their jobs and began to rely on digital platforms not merely as a supplementary source of income, but as their primary or sole means of livelihood (Costa, 2020).

It is important to note that activities performed by self-employed workers through digital platforms still lack specific regulatory frameworks. This normative gap allows for the mischaracterization of employment relationships, even when such relationships exhibit characteristics typical of employment, according to the criteria established by the Brazilian Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) (Fincato & Wunsch, 2020). Furthermore, a process of labor precarization has been observed, as workers who leave formal employment to operate as independent contractors often discontinue social security contributions. This transition has resulted in the loss of fundamental labor rights, such as paid vacation, the thirteenth salary, the Severance Indemnity Fund (FGTS), and access to unemployment insurance (Brandão & Da Ponte, 2021).

This topic has attracted increasing interest from the scientific community, as evidenced by the significant growth in the number of publications in recent years (Souza et al., 2018; Frogeri et al., 2026a). This interest encompasses both the analysis of service provision during the pandemic period and the investigation of the new reality faced by these workers in the post-pandemic context (Teixeira et al., 2022).

In addition to the increase in scientific studies (e.g., Frogeri et al., 2026a), the issue has also been widely debated within the Brazilian judiciary, including divergences in legal interpretations regarding the nature of the relationship between workers and digital platforms. At the end of 2022, the Superior Labor Court (TST) ruled on two similar cases within a four-day interval. In one case, the Court determined that the legal relationship between the worker and the digital platform constituted an employment relationship, whereas in the other case, it concluded that the relationship was one of independent service provision. Such divergences highlight the existence of legal uncertainty on the matter. Therefore, the objective of this study was to analyze the subordination of Gig Economy workers in light of Brazilian legislation.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

This section addresses the concepts related to the Gig Economy, including a historical perspective on the emergence of the term and its inherent contradictions. It then presents a discussion on informality and the precarization of labor relations, intensified by technological advancement.

### Gig Economy: Foundations and Contradictions

Service relationships within the Gig Economy suggest the existence of a specific, short-term task with defined compensation for the service provided (Frogeri et al., 2026a). It is often presented as an alternative means for independent service providers to increase their income or even for formally employed workers to earn supplementary income (Aloisi, 2015).

Digital platforms have facilitated the expansion of this form of work by enabling clients to meet their needs more efficiently while allowing service providers to access a broader customer base (Piketty, 2014).

In addition to the term Gig Economy, some authors employ expressions such as *crowdwork* and *on-demand work* (De Stefano, 2016), as well as *platform labor* (Van Doorn, 2017), all referring to task-based work typically mediated by digital platforms.

From one perspective, the Gig Economy offers certain advantages. According to Hurst and Pugsley (2011), self-employed workers have the autonomy to manage their own activities, set their schedules, and choose which tasks to perform.

Conversely, the Gig Economy is associated with the precarization of labor rights. Since independent workers do not have formally registered employment contracts, they lack access to fundamental labor protections, such as paid vacation, thirteenth salary, and weekly paid rest, as noted by Vaclavik, Oltramari, and Oliveira (2022). Abilio (2020) further argues that the Gig Economy may lead to the monopolization of economic activities and the centralization of control over labor.

Gehardt and Silveira (2009) emphasize that, in the transition from human to computer-mediated management, governance becomes automated, algorithms assume the role of employers, information asymmetries increase, and preexisting power imbalances are exacerbated. This imbalance is intentionally embedded in the architecture of the platforms themselves.

Moreover, the informal nature of these relationships may enable platforms to reduce wages and benefits (Dacheri & Goldschmidt, 2017), something that would not be permissible within a standard employment relationship (Article 7, item VI, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution).

Abraham (2017) also highlights that the Gig Economy may distort economic data, particularly regarding firm and national productivity, due to the absence of formalization and comprehensive recording of activities performed by independent workers.

In the United States, the Current Population Survey (CPS) collects monthly data on household income. The main sector productivity program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses CPS data to estimate hours worked by self-employed individuals. However, when such activities are entirely informal, the collected data may significantly diverge from actual conditions (Abraham, 2017).

During the pandemic period, with rising unemployment caused by COVID-19, many workers who had previously viewed digital platforms as an alternative source of income (e.g., Frogeri et al., 2026b) became fully dependent on this type of work to sustain themselves (Costa, 2020).

Despite the ongoing process of labor precarization, it has been observed in the post-pandemic period that a significant proportion of workers who began providing services through digital platforms chose not to return to formal employment relationships. According to a survey conducted by Datafolha and published in May 2023, 75% (seventy-five percent) of app-based drivers and delivery workers reported a preference for remaining in informal work arrangements.

In Brazil, similarly to other regions in the post-pandemic context, there has been an increase in the number of workers who rely exclusively on digital platforms for their livelihood. In several countries (e.g., the United States and European nations), including Brazil, service provision has become habitual within the same platform, even when serving different users (Ravenelle, 2019).

According to data from the PNAD (National Household Sample Survey), the number of informal workers reached a record level in 2022, totaling nearly thirteen million individuals - an increase of 14.90% compared to 2021 (Agência Brasil, 2025). This scenario fosters worker dependence on digital platforms and may result in further precarization of labor relations (Brandão & Da Ponte, 2021).

## **Informality and Labor Precarization**

Informality is conceptualized as a condition in which there is no formal contractual relationship or regulatory framework governing the provision of services, resulting in work arrangements devoid of rights and corresponding protections (Antunes, 2018).

Dacheri and Goldschmidt (2017) had already drawn attention to the risks associated with informality in the relationship between service providers and digital platforms, noting that the absence of oversight and specific legislation regulating such activities could lead to the precarization of labor.

Vaclavik, Ultramari, and Oliveira (2022) suggest that the increasing use of technology in service provision has expanded the range of activities that can be performed through digital platforms. While this initially appears beneficial, the lack of regulatory frameworks ultimately contributes to a shift in which formally employed workers transition into informal activities without labor protections. One consequence of this dynamic is cost reduction for service recipients, as hiring independent contractors becomes more economically advantageous than employing formally contracted workers due to the absence of labor rights.

In a report published in 2018, prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2018) presented findings indicating that approximately two-thirds of the global workforce was engaged in informal employment, predominantly concentrated in poorer regions. In Africa, 85.8% of employment was informal; in Arab States, the proportion was 68.6%; in Asia and the Pacific, 68.2%; in the Americas, approximately 40%; and slightly above 25% in Europe and Central Asia.

In Brazil, the report indicated an overall informality rate of 46%, with higher prevalence among men (37%) than women (21.5%). More broadly, the ILO study revealed that 93% of informal employment worldwide was concentrated in emerging and developing countries, and that informality was more frequent among men (63%) than women (52.1%) (ILO, 2018).

The report also highlighted concerns regarding job quality, noting that high levels of informality generate numerous adverse consequences for workers, businesses, and societies. It emphasized that a central challenge lies in promoting the creation of decent work for all (ILO, 2018).

Among the primary factors influencing informality levels, the ILO (2018) identifies education as a key determinant, as individuals with secondary or higher education are less likely to be engaged in informal employment.

In a subsequent report published in 2022, within a post-pandemic context, the ILO estimated that four-fifths of the global workforce was engaged in the informal economy (ILO, 2022). In Brazil, according to data from the PNAD (National Household Sample Survey), the number of informal workers reached a record level in 2022, totaling nearly thirteen million individuals - an increase of 14.90% compared to 2021 (Agência Brasil, 2025).

A further ILO study published in 2023 highlighted the dual nature of informal work. On one hand, it contributes to increased employment rates, as individuals who were previously without any income source begin to engage in remunerated activities. On the other hand, the quality of these occupations has declined. The study identifies a relationship between job recovery and the deterioration of job quality, resulting in labor precarization (ILO, 2023).

Regarding labor precarization, when compared to formal employment, Antunes (2018) demonstrates that the situation is highly concerning. Informal workers are often subjected to longer working hours than formally employed workers, experience high turnover rates, which affects access to benefits such as paid leave, and lack access to benefits such as transportation vouchers, health insurance, and childcare assistance, as they are classified as self-employed.

The growth of so-called precarious work is directly associated with rising unemployment (Fincato & Wunsch, 2020), as individuals in situations of economic vulnerability may accept unfavorable working conditions out of necessity.

Antunes (2018) also links precarious work to technological advancement, referring to it as a “new phase of the real subsumption of labor under capital.” As service-providing companies expand into new markets, they reshape labor conditions in those regions, creating what the author characterizes as a “nebulous” future, in which workers face uncertainty, lack legal protections, diminished social rights, and absence of retirement security.

According to a Datafolha survey published in March 2023, slightly more than 50% of respondents reported making social security contributions. This indicates that nearly half of the respondents are likely to lack access to fundamental worker protections, such as sick pay, disability retirement in cases of work incapacity, or retirement based on age or length of contribution.

In an initial attempt to address this issue, the Brazilian Federal Government enacted Resolution No. 148/2019, which included the category of “app-based drivers” within the Simples Nacional tax regime (Brazil, 2019). This change enabled such workers to formalize their activities as Individual Microentrepreneurs (MEIs) and contribute to social security. Nevertheless, the Datafolha survey (March 2023) revealed that although 7 out of 10 respondents were aware of the MEI system, they were not making any contributions.

## METHOD

This study is based on an exploratory qualitative research design using secondary data sources. The documentary basis of the research consists of judicial decisions issued by the Brazilian Superior Labor Court (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho – TST). To conduct the study, a comprehensive survey of judicial decisions on the topic was carried out using the jurisprudence search tools of both the TST and the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF), covering the period from January 1, 2021, to October 30, 2024.

The TST is the highest authority within Brazil’s labor judiciary, as established in Article 690 of the Consolidation of Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho – CLT). Among its primary competencies are adjudicating ordinary appeals from decisions rendered by Regional Labor Courts in cases of their original jurisdiction, as well as serving as the court of last instance for *revista* appeals filed against decisions issued by Regional Labor Courts and Labor Boards or trial judges, in accordance with Article 702 of the CLT.

The competencies of the STF are defined in Article 102 of the Federal Constitution. Among its responsibilities is the adjudication, through extraordinary appeals, of cases decided in a single or final instance when the challenged decision: (a) violates a provision of the

Constitution; (b) declares the unconstitutionality of a treaty or federal law; (c) upholds the validity of a local law or governmental act challenged under the Constitution; or (d) upholds the validity of a local law contested in light of federal law.

Accordingly, decisions issued by the TST in *revista* appeals - i.e., when reviewing rulings rendered by Regional Labor Courts (state-level jurisdiction) - are subject to review by the STF only when there is an allegation of a constitutional violation.

Furthermore, pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Article 102 of the Federal Constitution, the party seeking review before the STF must demonstrate the existence of general repercussion (*repercussão geral*) of the constitutional issues involved. Due to these restrictive requirements, most decisions rendered by the TST are not subject to review by the STF.

In identifying judicial decisions relevant to this study, only appellate decisions (*acórdãos*) containing the descriptors “employment relationship” (*vínculo empregatício*) and “digital platforms” (*plataformas digitais*) in their summaries were selected. The search conducted in the TST database yielded a total of 102 decisions. Of these, 99 cases did not recognize an employment relationship between service providers and digital platforms, while only three cases resulted in the recognition of such a relationship.

At the STF level, three decisions were identified. The cases analyzed by the STF did not address the substantive merits of the issues under discussion. However, on March 1, 2024, in the judgment of Extraordinary Appeal No. 1,446,336, Justice Edson Fachin recognized the existence of general repercussion in the matter. Consequently, General Repercussion Theme No. 1,291 was established, titled: “Recognition of an employment relationship between app-based transportation drivers and the company operating the digital platform.”

As a result, the full bench of the STF is expected to jointly examine the issue and issue a single binding decision, which will serve as a precedent for subsequent rulings on the matter within the Brazilian judiciary. At the time this study was written, the judgment of this theme had not yet been concluded.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

According to the Brazilian Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT), an employer is defined as an “individual or collective enterprise that assumes the risks of economic activity and hires, remunerates, and directs the personal provision of services.” The CLT further defines an employee as “any natural person who provides non-occasional services to an employer, under their dependence, and in exchange for wages.”

As previously noted, there is no consensus within the Brazilian judiciary regarding the legal nature of the relationship between Gig Economy workers, such as app-based drivers, and digital platforms. The Superior Labor Court (TST) has, in some cases, recognized the existence of an employment relationship, as in case No. 100853-94.2019.5.01.0067, decided on December 18, 2022. Conversely, the same court has also denied the existence of such a relationship, concluding instead that the arrangement constitutes independent service provision, as in case No. 1092-82.2021.5.12.0045, decided on December 14, 2022.

Among the legal requirements for establishing an employment relationship under the CLT, the cited rulings diverge primarily with respect to dependence, particularly the existence or

absence of subordination - namely, whether the worker is subject to the employer's directives in the performance of their services.

Subordination, as defined in Brazilian labor law, refers to legal subordination, which is characterized by the employer's authority to control the provision of services. In this framework, the employee occupies a hierarchically subordinate position, executing tasks in accordance with the employer's directives (Cassar, 2017).

This concept was significantly broadened in 2011 through amendments introduced by Law No. 12,551/2011, which eliminated the distinction between work performed on the employer's premises and remote work. More importantly, the reform established that telematic and computerized means of supervision are equivalent, for purposes of legal subordination, to direct and personal command.

This legal modification made it possible to recognize subordination mediated by digital platforms, giving rise to the concept of algorithmic subordination, or disruptive legal subordination (Gaia, 2018).

Forouzan and Mosharraf, as cited by Ziviani (2010), define an algorithm as "a set of unambiguous steps that produces a result within a finite period." Regarding the role of algorithms in digital platforms, Gaia (2018) highlights the use of "dynamic pricing" by platforms such as Uber, whereby the platform determines the fare and can automatically adjust it based on algorithmic calculations that consider factors such as supply and demand in a given region, distance, and trip duration.

Gaia (2018) further demonstrates that drivers are continuously monitored through algorithmic systems, including user ratings processed by the platform, formal complaints, and financial incentives that increase earnings based on the amount of time drivers remain available on the platform.

Despite the technological sophistication and partial disclosure of operational criteria, workers providing services through digital platforms often experience uncertainty and distrust, as they are frequently unable to access or fully understand the outcomes generated by algorithms (Borges & Rezende, 2022). These authors also identify deficiencies in platform practices related to transparency, task allocation, remuneration, performance evaluation, surveillance, and punitive mechanisms.

Empirical research conducted by Borges and Rezende (2022) indicates that surveillance extends beyond basic metrics such as GPS location and trip duration. It also includes detailed behavioral data, such as driving speed, acceleration patterns, braking behavior, and even smartphone vibrations during trips. However, the lack of transparency is intrinsic to algorithmic systems, which are inherently complex, as decision-making processes incorporate not only operational factors but also technical and logical structures embedded within the algorithms themselves (Burrell, 2016).

Fincato and Wunsch (2020) emphasize the need to reconsider the traditional concept of legal subordination, as its rigid application tends to exclude platform-based workers from labor protections.

Another key element in determining the existence of an employment relationship concerns the allocation of economic risk. According to Delgado (2017), the employer's assumption of economic risk is a fundamental principle of employment relationships, known as the principle of alterity.

In recent years, particularly during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a significant increase in remote work, including home office and telework arrangements (IPEA, 2022). Under the principle of alterity, it has been established that employers are responsible for providing the necessary tools and covering the costs required for employees to perform their duties remotely. Delgado (2017) argues that Article 75-D of the CLT, which regulates telework, must be interpreted in conjunction with Article 2 of the same statute, thereby assigning these costs to the employer.

In the case of app-based drivers, judicial interpretations diverge. Digital platforms argue that driver compensation already accounts for operational costs, including vehicle maintenance, as payment includes compensation for the use of the vehicle in each trip. Uber, for instance, states that a portion of each fare is allocated to operational expenses, including insurance (Uber, 2020).

On the other hand, when analyzing civil liability, the Brazilian Civil Code, in Article 932, item III, establishes that employers, or those equivalent to employers, are liable for damages caused by their agents in the course of service provision. This provision has served as a legal basis for holding Uber liable for damages suffered by a passenger, as in case No. 1038509-13.2019.8.26.0100, decided by the 15th Chamber of Private Law of the São Paulo Court of Justice (Conjur, 2022).

However, there are also decisions denying such liability, on the grounds that the contractual relationship exists solely between the passenger and the driver, not between the passenger and the platform, as in case No. 1012376-75.2017.8.26.0011, decided by the 2nd Civil Appellate Panel of the Lapa Small Claims Court (Migalhas, 2020).

Therefore, when analyzing the requirements for recognizing an employment relationship, significant jurisprudential divergence emerges, as these issues depend heavily on interpretation. This scenario reflects a state of legal uncertainty affecting both workers and digital platforms.

Moreover, subordination in platform-mediated labor relations can be further understood through the lens of surveillance capitalism (Lacerda, Prevot, & Moura, 2025). In this context, platforms operate not merely as service intermediaries but as infrastructures for data collection, processing, and exploitation, exerting control over workers through continuous and opaque algorithmic mechanisms (Vallas & Schor, 2020).

Lacerda, Prevot, and Moura (2025) argue that the centrality of data in the contemporary economy enables not only the coordination of supply and demand but also the detailed monitoring of worker behavior, influencing performance, compensation, and access to job opportunities. This dynamic demonstrates that subordination in such contexts extends beyond its traditional legal dimension, encompassing informational and technological aspects that reinforce power asymmetries between platforms and workers (Jiang, Hu, & Li, 2025) and contribute to the intensification of labor precarization (Alacovska, Bucher, & Fieseler, 2024), even when framed within narratives of autonomy and flexibility (Parent-Rocheleau & Parker, 2022).

## FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study aimed to analyze subordination in labor relations within the Gig Economy in light of Brazilian legislation, highlighting the tensions between traditional legal categories and new forms of work organization mediated by digital platforms. Based on documentary analysis of judicial decisions and the adopted theoretical framework, it was found that the absence of a specific regulatory framework, combined with the inadequacy of classical labor law concepts, contributes to the persistence of divergent interpretations within the judiciary.

The findings demonstrate that the traditional notion of legal subordination, grounded in the idea of direct and hierarchical control, is insufficient to capture contemporary labor dynamics. In the context of the Gig Economy, control manifests in a diffuse manner, mediated by algorithms, rating systems, and data-driven management mechanisms, constituting what the literature defines as algorithmic subordination. In this setting, even in the absence of the traditional figure of the employer, there are sophisticated forms of direction and control over labor activity that challenge the binary distinction between independent work and subordinated employment.

Furthermore, when incorporating the perspective of surveillance capitalism, it becomes evident that the exercise of power by digital platforms extends beyond the organizational sphere of work into the informational domain. The large-scale collection and processing of data enable not only service optimization but also the intensification of control over workers, thereby increasing power asymmetries and reinforcing workers' structural dependence on platforms. This finding underscores the need to conceptualize subordination as a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing legal, economic, and technological elements.

At the empirical level, the analysis of decisions issued by the Superior Labor Court reveals the absence of a consolidated understanding regarding the legal nature of these relationships, contributing to a scenario of legal uncertainty. Although most decisions do not recognize the existence of an employment relationship, elements typically associated with such relationships remain present, particularly with respect to economic dependence and platform-based control mechanisms.

In light of these findings, it can be concluded that Brazilian labor law is undergoing a process of conceptual lag in relation to the transformations brought about by the digital economy. The persistence of rigid legal categories hinders the proper classification of emerging forms of work, potentially resulting in the exclusion of a significant number of workers from traditional legal protections.

As a theoretical contribution, this study proposes an expansion of the concept of subordination to incorporate its algorithmic and informational dimensions, enabling a more accurate analysis of labor relations within the Gig Economy. From a practical standpoint, the findings suggest the need for the development of a regulatory framework that accounts for the specificities of platform-mediated work, ensuring minimum levels of social protection while recognizing the particular characteristics of this production model.

Finally, future research is encouraged to further explore the empirical conditions of work within the Gig Economy, as well as to investigate the impacts of personal data regulation and algorithmic transparency on labor relations. The complexity of the phenomenon requires interdisciplinary approaches capable of integrating law, economics, and

technology in order to adequately understand and regulate the ongoing transformations in the world of work.

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